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Abstract
Liquid democracy allows members of an electorate
to either directly vote over alternatives, or delegate
their voting rights to someone they trust. Most
of the liquid democracy literature and implemen-
tations allow each voter to nominate only one del-
egate per election. However, if that delegate ab-
stains, the voting rights assigned to her are left un-
used. To minimise the number of unused delega-
tions, it has been suggested that each voter should
declare a personal ranking over voters she trusts.
In this paper, we show that even if personal rank-
ings over voters are declared, the standard delega-
tion method of liquid democracy remains problem-
atic. More specifically, we show that when per-
sonal rankings over voters are declared, it could
be undesirable to receive delegated voting rights,
which is contrary to what liquid democracy fun-
damentally relies on. To solve this issue, we pro-
pose a new method to delegate voting rights in an
election, called breadth-first delegation. Addition-
ally, the proposed method prioritises assigning vot-
ing rights to individuals closely connected to the
voters who delegate.
1 Introduction
Liquid democracy is a middle ground between direct and rep-
resentative democracy, as it allows each member of the elec-
torate to directly vote on a topic, or temporarily choose a rep-
resentative by delegating her voting rights to another voter.
Therefore individuals who are either apathetic for an election,
or trust the knowledge of another voter more than their own,
can still have an impact on the election result (through dele-
gating). An individual who casts a vote for themselves and
for others is known as a guru (Christoff and Grossi 2017).
Liquid democracy has recently started gaining attention in a
few domains which we discuss to show an overview of the
general societal interest. In the political domain, local parties
such as the Pirate Party in Germany, Demoex in Sweden, the
Net Party in Argentina and Partido de Internet in Spain have
been experimenting with liquid democracy implementations.
Additionally, the local governments of the London Southwark
∗This work was supported by the EPSRC grant EP/P031811/1.
borough and the Italian cities Turino and San Dona di Piave
are working on integrating liquid democracy for community
engagement processes (Boella et al. 2018). In the technol-
ogy domain, the online platform LiquidFeedback uses a liq-
uid democracy system where a user selects a single guru for
different topics (Behrens et al. 2014; Kling et al. 2015). An-
other prominent online example is GoogleVotes (Hardt and
Lopes 2015), where each user wishing to delegate can select
a ranking over other voters.
Regardless of the increasing interest in liquid democracy,
there exists outstanding theoretical issues. This work focuses
on liquid democracy systems where each individual wishing
to delegate can select a ranking over other voters. In such
systems, given the common interpretation that delegations of
voting rights are multi-step and transitive1, we observe that:
searching for a guru follows a depth-first search in a graph
that illustrates all delegation preferences within an electorate,
e.g. nodes represent the voters and directed edges the dele-
gation choices for each voter. For this reason, we name this
standard approach of delegating voting rights as depth-first
delegation. Despite its common acceptance, we came across
an important disadvantage for this rule. We show that when
depth-first delegation is used, it could be undesirable to re-
ceive the voting rights of someone else. At this point, we em-
phasize that disincentivising voters to participate as gurus is
in contrast to the ideology of liquid democracy. Motivated by
this, we propose a new rule for delegating voting rights, the
breadth-first delegation, which guarantees that casting voters
(those who do not delegate or abstain) weakly prefer to re-
ceive delegated voting rights, i.e. to participate as a guru.
We outline this paper as follows: Section 1 discusses the
latest applied and theoretical developments in liquid democ-
racy and gives our model’s preliminaries. In Sections 2 & 3,
we define delegation graphs, delegation rules and two types
of participation. Section 4 formally introduces a new delega-
tion rule while Section 5 compares this rule with the standard
one. Finally, Section 6 concludes this work.
1.1 Related work
There currently exists a lack of theoretical analysis on liquid
democracy. However, we summarise the main differences of
our work to the main undertaking so far.
1If a voter i delegates to a voter j, then i transfers to j the voting
rights of herself and all the others that had been delegated to i.
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As outlined by Brill (2018), one of the main ongoing issues
in liquid democracy is how to handle personal rankings over
voters. His work discusses possible solutions around this is-
sue without giving a formalised model, which this paper does.
For two election alternatives and a ground truth on which the
correct one is, Kahng et al. (2018) find that: (a) there is no
decentralised liquid democracy delegation rule that is guar-
anteed to outperform direct democracy and (b) there is a cen-
tralised liquid democracy delegation rule that is guaranteed to
outperform direct democracy as long as voters are not com-
pletely misinformed or perfectly informed about the ground
truth. In comparison, our model can be used in a wider vari-
ety of elections, as it allows for multiple alternatives and no
ground truth. Additionally our delegation rules can be used in
a central or decentralised manner, thus the negative result (a)
does not apply to our paper. The work of Christoff and Grossi
(2017) focuses on the existence of delegation cycles and in-
consistencies that can occur when there are several binary is-
sues to be voted on with a different guru assigned for each
issue. In comparison, we avoid delegation cycles by stating
that a delegation chain (a path from a delegating voter to their
assigned guru) cannot include the same voter more than once.
Furthermore, individual rationality issues between multiple
elections is out of scope for this work. Last, Brill and Tal-
mon (2018) introduce a special case of Christoff and Grossi’s
model, which allows a single voter to be assigned several gu-
rus. However, our model assigns one guru per voter.
Similar to our work, GoogleVotes (Hardt and Lopes 2015)
allows a user to select a ranking over other voters and uses,
what the authors describe as, a back-track breadth first search
to assign a guru to a voter. We cannot complete a more
comprehensive comparison to GoogleVotes as they have pub-
lished only a general description of their system (without a
formal model). However, we know that their delegation rule
is different to our proposed breadth-first delegation rule as
in the Tally/Coverage section of their video example (from
minute 32 of Hardt 2014), their rule assigns guru C to voter
F , while our rule would assign guru A to voter F .
1.2 Preliminaries
Consider a set of voters V and a set of alternatives or out-
comes A. The set of possible electorates is given by E(V) =
2V\{∅}, i.e. non-empty subsets of V . In our model, for every
election there are three sets of electorates V a, V c, V d ∈ E(V)
such that V a ∩ V c ∩ V d = ∅ and V a ∪ V c ∪ V d = V , where
sets V a, V c, V d consist of those who abstain, cast a vote and
wish to delegate their voting rights, respectively.
A preference relation over alternatives for a voter i ∈ V is
denoted by Ai and is a binary relation on A, i.e.: for x, y ∈
A with x 6= y, the expression x Ai y indicates that voter i
strictly prefers alternative x over alternative y. A preference
relation over voters for voter i ∈ V is denoted by Vi and is
a binary relation on V , i.e.: for i, x, y ∈ V with2 i 6= x, y
and x 6= y, the expression x Vi y indicates that voter i
strictly prefers to delegate her voting rights to voter x instead
of voter y. For both preference relations, we allow an index
2A voter cannot include herself in her preference relation over
voters.
to identify ranking positions e.g. for any i ∈ Vd, her m-th
preferred voter is denoted by Vi,m.
Consider a binary relation on a set W given by Wi . Then
Wi is: (a) complete iff for every pair x, y ∈ W either
x Wi y or y Wi x holds, (b) antisymmetric iff for every
pair x, y ∈ W , if x Wi y then y Wi x does not hold, and
(c) transitive iff for all x, y, z ∈ W , if x Wi y and y Wi z,
then x Wi z. Both preference relations over alternatives and
preference relations over voters are antisymmetric and transi-
tive but not complete (we do not enforce voters to rank every
other member of the electorate as we consider this an unreal-
istic scenario for large electorates).
The set of all possible preference relations Ai and Vi ,
for any i ∈ V , are denoted by RA and RV , respectively.
A preference profile over alternatives is a function PA :
E(V)→ 2RA , where PA(N) returns a set of preference rela-
tions over alternatives (maximum one for each voter in N ).
For example, given an electorate N = {i, j, k}, a prefer-
ence profile PA(N) could return {(i,Ai ), (j,Aj )}, mean-
ing that agent i and j have been assigned a preference rela-
tion over alternatives but k has not (as k is either delegating
or abstaining). Similarly, we define as a preference profile
over voters a function PV : E(V) → 2RV , where PV(N)
returns a set of preference relations over voters (maximum
one for each voter in N ). Given profiles PA and PV , voters
are assigned to the V a, V c and V d electorates as follows. If
(i,Ai ) ∈ PA(N), we infer that voter i casts a vote accord-
ing to Ai and therefore becomes a member of the casting
electorate V c. If (i,Ai ) /∈ PA(N) and (i,Vi ) ∈ PV(N),
then i becomes a member of the delegating electorate V d. If
(i,Ai ) /∈ PA(N) and (i,Vi ) /∈ PV(N), i becomes a mem-
ber of the abstaining electorate V a.
Given an electorate N , adding or removing a preference
relation over alternatives (or over voters) from a preference
profile over alternatives PA(N) (or over voters PV(N)), is
denoted as follows. For a tuple (i,Ai ) ∈ PA(N), a voter
j ∈ V \ N and j’s assigned preference relation over alterna-
tives Aj ∈ RA:
PA−i(N) := P
A(N) \ {(i,Ai )},
PA+(j,Aj )(N) := P
A(N) ∪ {(j,Aj )}.
Similarly, for a tuple (i,Vi ) ∈ PV(N), a voter j ∈ V \ N
and j’s assigned preference relation over voters Vj ∈ RV :
PV−i(N) := P
V(N) \ {(i,Vi )},
PV+(j,Vj )(N) := P
V(N) ∪ {(j,Vj )}.
To simplify the above, we will be using the notation
PA, PV , PA−i, P
A
+j , P
V
−i and P
V
+j , accordingly.
2 Delegation graph and delegation rules
We use a graph to model possible delegations between voters:
Definition 1. A delegation graph is a weighted directed graph
G = (V, E, w) where:
• V is the set of nodes representing the agents registered
as voters;
• E is the set of directed edges representing delegations
between voters; and
• w is the weight function w : E 7→ N that assigns a value
to an edge (i, j) equal to i’s preference ranking of j.
To generate a delegation graph, we use the following:
Definition 2. Define as g the delegation graph function which
takes as input a preference profile over voters PV and returns
the related delegation graph G = (V, E, w) with the follow-
ing property: for every i, j ∈ V and i 6= j,
• if there exists (i,Vi ) ∈ PV with Vi,x= j; then there
exists (i, j) ∈ E where w((i, j)) = x.
We can evaluate a delegation graph through the following:
Definition 3. A delegation rule function d takes as input a
preference profile over alternatives PA together with a dele-
gation graph G, and returns another preference profile over
alternatives PˆA that resolves delegations. More specifically,
• if (i,Ai ) ∈ PˆA, then i casts her vote,
• if (i,Aj ) ∈ PˆA for a voter j 6= i, then j becomes i’s
final delegate, i.e. her guru,
• if (i,Ak ) /∈ PˆA for any k ∈ V , then i abstains.
For each voter i ∈ V , a delegation rule analyses the subtree
of the delegation graph rooted at node i and decides whether
i casts, delegates or abstains. If voter i is found to delegate,
the chosen delegation rule function will traverse i’s subtree to
find i’s guru.
To get the outcome of an election, we use a voting rule
function f . In our model, f takes as input the modified pref-
erence profile over alternatives PˆA (which incorporates del-
egations) and returns a single winner or a ranking over alter-
natives (depending on the voting rule used). In Section 5, we
show that the output of the voting rule depends on the chosen
delegation rule, meaning that we could get different election
results when only the delegation rule function is different, i.e.
f(d(PA, g(PV))) 6= f(d′(PA, g(PV))), when d 6= d′.
3 Cast and guru participation
The key property that we investigate is participation. The par-
ticipation property holds if a voter, by joining an electorate,
is at least as satisfied as before joining. This property has
been defined only in the context of vote casting (Fishburn and
Brams 1983; Moulin 1988). Due to the addition of delega-
tions in our model, we establish two separate definitions of
participation reflecting this new functionality3.
For both of the following definitions, note that for an elec-
torate N ∈ E(V), the set of all preference profiles over al-
ternatives is given by PA,N , while the set of all preference
profiles over delegates is given by PV,N .
3There could be other interesting participation properties for liq-
uid democracy, such as incentivising deviation from delegating to
casting. But this is out of the paper’s scope, as we focus on find-
ing delegation rules that weakly benefit casting voters who become
gurus.
A voting rule f satisfies the cast participation property
when every voter i ∈ V weakly prefers joining any possible
voting electorate V c compared to abstaining and regardless
of who is in the delegating electorate V d.
Definition 4. The Cast Participation property holds for a vot-
ing rule f iff:
f(d(PA, g(PV))) Ai f(d(PA−i, g(PV))),
for every possible disjoint casting and delegating electorates
V c, V d ∈ E(V), where i ∈ V c, and every possible preference
profile for these electorates PA ∈ PA,V c and PV ∈ PV,V d .
For any casting and delegating electorates V c and V d, a
voting rule f satisfies the guru participation property when
any voter i ∈ V c weakly benefits from receiving additional
voting rights of any voter j ∈ V .
Definition 5. The Guru Participation property holds for a vot-
ing rule f iff:
f(d(PA, g(PV))) Ai f(d(PA, g(PV−j))), (1)
for every possible disjoint casting and delegating electorates
V c, V d ∈ E(V), where i ∈ V c , j ∈ V d, and every possible
profile PA ∈ PA,V c and PV ∈ PV,V d that assign j’s vote to
guru i, i.e. (j,Ai ) ∈ d(PA, g(PV)).
Let F be the set of all voting rules. It is known that
only a subset F¯ ⊂ F satisfy (cast) participation. For exam-
ple, Fishburn and Brams (1983) show that single transferable
vote does not satisfy (cast) participation, while Moulin (1988)
shows there is no Condorcet-consistent voting rule satisfying
this property given 25 or more voters. We explores guru par-
ticipation for voting rules in F¯ , and our results build on the
following observation, which we intuitively descibe: if a new
voter j joins the delegating electorate and only one voter i
from the casting electorate increases the number of times she
is assigned as a guru, then guru participation is satisfied.
Observation 1. Consider i, j ∈ V , profile PˆA returned by
d(PA, g(PV)) and profile Pˆ
′A returned by d(PA, g(PV+j)),
where i has been assigned as j’s guru, i.e. (j,Vi ) ∈ Pˆ
′A.
Guru i becomes weakly better off after j delegates if the fol-
lowing holds. For every k ∈ V:
(a) k’s vote is assigned to guru l ∈ V by both returned pref-
erence profiles, i.e. (k,Vl ) ∈ PˆA ∩ Pˆ
′A, or
(b) k’s vote is assigned to guru i after j joins the delegating
electorate, i.e. (k,Ai ) ∈ Pˆ
′A,
4 Introducing breadth-first delegation
Recall that liquid democracy allows for multi-step delega-
tions. Therefore, the guru of any i ∈ V d could be any voter
j ∈ V c who is in the sub tree of the delegation graph with
root i. In addition, the assigned guru j may not be included
in i’s preference relation Vi , i.e. it could be that @ x such
that Vi,x= j. In this case, there is at least one intermedi-
ate delegator between voter i and the assigned guru j. To
find the exact intermediate delegators, we introduce delega-
tion chains. A delegation chain for a voter i ∈ V d starts with
i, then lists the intermediate voters in V d who have further
delegated i’s voting rights and ends with i’s assigned guru
j ∈ V c. These chains (see Definition 6) must satisfy the fol-
lowing conditions: (a) no voter occurs more than once in the
chain (to avoid infinite delegation cycles that could otherwise
occur) and (b) each member of the chain must be linked to the
next member through an edge in the delegation graph, which
is generated from the given preference profile over voters.
Definition 6. Given profiles PA and PV , a voter i ∈ V d and
her guru j ∈ V c, we define a Delegation Chain for i to be an
ordered tuple Ci = 〈i, . . . , j〉 with the following properties:
(a) For an integer x ∈ [1, |Ci|], let Ci,x indicate the voter
at the x-th position in Ci. Then for any pair of integers
x, y ∈ [1, |Ci|] with x 6= y,
Ci,x 6= Ci,y.
(b) For each integer z ∈ [1, |Ci| − 1], there exists an edge
(Ci,z, Ci,z+1) ∈ E ∈ g(PV).
Observe that the x in the expression Ci,x also indicates
how deep the voter Ci,x is in the delegation graph sub-
tree rooted with i. Thus sometimes we refer to x as
the depth of Ci,x in Ci. The function w takes as in-
put a delegation chain and returns a list of the weights as-
signed to each edge among voters in Ci, that is, w(Ci) =
[w(Ci)1, . . . , w(Ci)x, . . . , w(Ci)n−1], where w(Ci)x is the
weight of edge (Ci,x, Ci,x+1) and n = |Ci|.
Delegation chains can be used as a tool to find a guru for
a voter i ∈ V d. The standard interpretation of liquid democ-
racy delegations prioritises all possible delegation chains in-
volving i and i’s most preferred voterVi,1 before all possible
delegation chains involving i and i’s second preferred voter
Vi,2 and so on. Note that this priority rule hold for the deeper
levels of the delegation graph subtree rooted at i. In other
words, we observe that the standard way to select i’ guru is
to choose the first casting voter found through a depth first
search in i’s subtree, which motivates the next definition.
A depth-first delegation rule dD assigns guru j to i iff: (a)
there is a delegation chain Ci that can be formed from i to
j, and (b) there is no other delegation chain C ′i leading to a
different guru k that has a smaller weight at the earliest depth
after the root, compared to Ci.
Definition 7. For i, j, k ∈ V , a depth-first delegation rule dD
returns a profile PˆA with (i,Aj ) ∈ PˆA iff (a) and (b) hold:
(a) ∃ Ci with Ci,|Ci| = j,
(b) @ C ′i such that:
b1. C ′i,|C′i| = k for k 6= j,
b2. • ∃y: w(C ′i)y < w(Ci)y and
• w(C ′i)x ≤ w(Ci)x for all 0 < x < y.
Example 1. Consider the delegation graph in Figure 1 (a).
There are two delegation chains4 available for voter p ∈ V:
Cp = 〈p, r〉 and C ′p = 〈p, q, s〉 with weights w(Cp) = [2]
4Recall that 〈p, q, t〉 is not a valid delegation chain as t /∈ V c.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) A delegation graph with electorates V a =
{t}, V c = {s, r} and V d = {p, q}, meaning that t ab-
stains, s, r cast, and p, q delegate. The preference rela-
tions over alternatives are: “No”As “Yes” and “Yes”Ar
“No”. (b) A delegation graph with electorates V a =
{}, V c = {s, r} and V d = {p, q, t}. The preference
relations over alternatives remain the same. The only dif-
ference to (a) is that voter t decides to delegate with a
preference relation over voters p Vt r.
and w(C ′p) = [1, 2], respectively. The d
D rule returns pro-
file PˆA that assigns s as the guru of p, i.e. (p,As ) ∈ PˆA,
due to inequality w(C ′p)1 < w(Cp)1. Note that C
′
p satisfies
Definition 7.
In Example 1, p’s voting right is assigned to guru s, but
why should s (who is the second preference of q) outrank
agent p’s explicit second preference r? This question gains
even more importance the longer the depth first delegation
chain is. Given this issue, we define a novel delegation rule
that prioritises a voter’s explicit preferences as follows. A
breadth-first delegation rule dB assigns guru j to i iff: (a)
there is a delegation chain Ci that can be formed from i to
j; and (b) there is no other delegation chain C ′i leading to
a different guru k with: either a shorter length or, an equal
length and a smaller weight at the earliest depth after the root,
compared to Ci.
Definition 8. For i, j, k ∈ V , a breadth-first delegation rule
dB returns a profile PˆA with (i,Aj ) ∈ PˆA iff (a) and (b)
hold:
(a) ∃ Ci with Ci,|Ci| = j,
(b) @ C ′i such that C ′i,|Ci| = k, for k 6= j, and
b1. |C ′i| < |Ci|, or
b2. • |C ′i| = |Ci| and
• ∃y: w(C ′i)y < w(Ci)y and
• w(C ′i)x ≤ w(Ci)x for all 0 < x < y.
Example 2. Consider the delegation graph in Figure 1 (a).
There are two delegation chains available for voter p ∈ V:
Cp = 〈p, r〉 and C ′p = 〈p, q, s〉 with weights w(Cp) = [2]
and w(C ′p) = [1, 2], respectively. The d
B rule returns profile
PˆA that assigns r as the guru of p, i.e. (p,Ar ) ∈ PˆA, due to
inequality |Cp| < |C ′p|. Note that Cp satisfies Definition 8.
DELEGATION GRAPH DELEGATION RULE Yes No
Figure 1 (a) dD 1 3
Figure 1 (b) dD 3 2
Figure 1 (a) dB 2 2
Figure 1 (b) dB 3 2
Table 1: Election results for Figure 1 when using either the
depth-first or the breadth-first delegation rule.
5 Depth-first versus breadth-first delegation
Through the next two examples, we show that different dele-
gation rules can have different properties. More specifically,
we present an instance where the depth-first delegation rule
cannot guarantee guru participation, while the breadth-first
delegation rule does.
Example 3. Consider the delegation graph in Figure 1(a)
and all possible delegation chains available to each voter
in V d: Cp = 〈p, r〉, C ′p = 〈p, q, s〉 and Cq = 〈q, s〉.
Using rule dD, voter p is assigned guru s through chain
C ′p (see Example 1), while voter q is also assigned guru s
through chainCq . Therefore dD returns the preference profile
over alternatives {(p,As ), (q,As ), (s,As ), (r,Ar )}. Us-
ing rule dB instead, voter p is assigned guru r through Cp
(see Example 2), while q’s guru remains the same. There-
fore dB returns another preference profile over alternatives:
{(p,Ar ), (q,As ), (s,As ), (r,Ar )}.
In the next example we focus on the case where the previ-
ously abstaining voter t decides to delegate and show that the
election result is inversed only when dD is used (see Table 1).
Example 4. Consider the delegation graph in Figure 1(b)
and all possible delegation chains available to each voter in
V d with their respective edge weights:
DELEGATION CHAIN EDGE WEIGHTS
Cp = 〈p, r〉 w(Cp) = [2],
C ′p = 〈p, q, s〉 w(C ′p) = [1, 2],
C ′′p = 〈p, q, t, r〉 w(C ′′p ) = [1, 1, 2],
Cq = 〈q, s〉 w(Cq) = [2],
C ′q = 〈q, t, r〉 w(C ′q) = [1, 2],
C ′′q = 〈q, t, p, r〉 w(C ′′q ) = [1, 1, 2],
Ct = 〈t, r〉 w(Ct) = [2],
C ′t = 〈t, p, r〉 w(C ′t) = [1, 2],
C ′′t = 〈t, p, q, s〉 w(C ′′t ) = [1, 1, 2].
Using rule dD, observe that voter p is assigned guru r
through the chain C ′′p due to w(C
′′
p )1 < w(Cp)1, w(C
′′
p )1 =
w(C ′p)1 and w(C
′′
p )2 < w(C
′
p)2. Voter q is also as-
signed guru r through chain C ′′q since w(C
′′
q )1 < w(Cq)1,
w(C ′′q )1 = w(C
′
q)1 and w(C
′′
q )2 < w(C
′
q)2. Last, voter
t is assigned guru s through chain C ′′t because w(C
′′
t )1 <
w(Ct)1, w(C ′′t )1 = w(C
′
t)1 and w(C
′′
t )2 < w(C
′
t)2. There-
fore rule dD returns the preference profile over alterna-
tives {(p,Ar ), (q,Ar ), (s,As ), (r,Ar ), (t,As )}. Using
rule dB instead, voter p is assigned guru r through the chain
Cp due to inequalities |Cp| < |C ′p| < |C ′′p |. Voter q is as-
signed guru s through Cq due to |Cq| < |C ′q| < |C ′′q | and
voter t is assigned guru r through Ct because of |Ct| <
|C ′t| < |C ′′t |. Therefore, rule dB returns the profile over al-
ternatives {(p,Ar ), (q,As ), (s,As ), (r,Ar ), (t,Ar )}.
Examples 3 and 4 show that guru participation may not
hold for depth-first delegation when a cycle exists in the del-
egation graph. Due to this cycle, when t joins the election,
both r and s receive new delegated voting rights, thus Obser-
vation 1 does not occur5. We summarise the above for the set
of voting rules satisfying cast participation F¯ .
Theorem 1. Given a voting rule f ∈ F¯ , guru participation is
not guaranteed to hold when using the depth-first delegation
rule dD.
Proof. Consider the preference profile over alternatives and
the preference profile over voters of Figure 1(b),
PA = {(r,Ar ), (s,As )}
PV = {(p,Vp ), (q,Vq ), (t,Vt )},
where the preferences over alternatives for r and s are: “Yes”
Ar “No”, “No”As “Yes” and the preferences over voters for
p, q, t are: q Vp r, t Vq s and p Vt r. We prove this
theorem using Examples 3 and 4. In Example 3, where voter
t abstains, rule dD returns profile
dD(PA, g(PV−t)) = {(p,As ), (q,As ), (s,As ), (r,Ar )},
which gives three votes (via s) for alternative “No” and one
vote (via r) for alternative “Yes” (see also Table 1). From
Example 4 where voter t delegates, rule dD returns profile
dD(PA, g(PV)) =
{(p,Ar ), (q,Ar ), (s,As ), (r,Ar ), (t,As )},
which gives three votes for “Yes” and two votes for “No”.
Observe that the election result changes from “No” to “Yes”
despite the fact that t votes for “No” through her guru s, i.e.
(t,As ) ∈ dD(PA, g(PV)). Note that due to the preference
“No”As “Yes”, we get
f(dD(PA, g(PV))) ≺As f(dD(PA, g(PV−t))), (2)
where f is a voting rule satisfying cast participation. How-
ever, the preference expressed by (2) implies that guru s be-
comes worst off after t delegates to her, which violates the
definition of guru participation (1), proving this theorem.
We highlight that if a delegation graph has no cycle then
guru participation is guaranteed to hold for the depth-first del-
egation rule, which show through Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
Lemma 1. When using depth-first delegation rule dD, if there
is no cycle in the delegation graph then Observation 1 holds.
5Observation 1 states how guru participation can be satisfied
when a voting rule satisfying cast participation is used: when a voter
joins the delegating electorate, if only one voter increase the number
of times assigned as a guru, then this voter is weakly better off.
Proof. Assume there exists a delegation graph with no cycles
where Observation 1 does not hold. We show that the only
case where Observation 1 does not hold is when a cycle exists.
Recall that, by Observation 1, guru participation is guaran-
teed to hold if whenever a voter j joins the delegating elec-
torate, there exists only one voter, say i, in the casting elec-
torate who increases the number of times she becomes a guru.
Consider another voter k who changes her assigned guru to a
voter l after j joins the delegating electorate, where l 6= i and
k 6= j. This means that, apart from i, voter l also increases
the times she becomes a guru. Next we describe that, when
dD is used, this case can only arise through the following
circumstance. Let guru i be assigned to voter j through dele-
gation chain Cj = 〈j, . . . , i〉 and guru l be assigned to voter
k through delegation chain Ck = 〈k, ..., j, ..., l〉. Chain Ck
must pass through j because all chains without j are avail-
able before j delegates. Note that even if both chains pass
through voter j, they end at different gurus. For dD, this only
occurs if there exists a voter h with h 6= i, j, l, such that
Cj = 〈j, . . . , h, . . . , i〉 and (3)
Ck = 〈k, . . . , h, . . . , j, . . . , l〉. (4)
The reason for the above is that k’s delegation goes through
h to reach j, but then the preferred delegation from j passes
through h (see chain Cj). As k’s delegation already includes
h before j, and an intermediator voter cannot be repeated
(definition 3), k uses another route to guru l (through a less
preferred option of j). From (3) and (4), observe that there ex-
ists a cycle in the graph, i.e. the cycle 〈h, ..., j, ..., h〉, which
contradicts our assumption and proves the lemma.
Theorem 2. Given a voting rule f ∈ F¯ and a delegation
graph with no cycles, guru participation is guaranteed to hold
when using the depth-first delegation rule dD.
Proof. We prove this using Lemma 1 and Observation 1.
We have previously shown that depth-first delegation does
not guarantee guru participation when the delegation graph
contains cycles. The next theorem states that breadth-first del-
egation always guarantees guru participation. To show this,
we first introduce the following observation and lemma.
Observation 2. Consider two voters j and k in a delegating
electorate. Using the breadth-first delegation rule dB , if k is
assigned guru l through a delegation chain Ck with j /∈ Ck,
then k is assigned guru l even when j abstains. This is be-
cause rule dB has used Ck ahead of any possible delegation
chain that includes j. Therefore chain Ck will still be used
by dB when j is in the abstaining electorate and no possible
delegation chain that includes j can be formed.
Lemma 2. Consider two voters j and k in a delegating elec-
torate. Using the breadth-first delegation rule dB , if voter
k is assigned her guru through a delegation chain Ck with
j ∈ Ck, then k is assigned the same guru as j.
Proof. Assume that, using dB , voter j is assigned guru i
through delegation chain Cj = 〈j . . . , i〉 and k is assigned
a different guru l through a delegation chain that includes j,
i.e. Ck = 〈k, . . . , j, . . . , l〉. Then either (a) or (b) occurs:
(a) rule dB should use chain C ′j = 〈j, . . . , l〉, which contra-
dicts the assumption that Cj is used,
(b) there exists a shared intermediate voter e such that
Cj = 〈j, . . . , e, g, . . . , i〉 and
Ck = 〈k, . . . , f, j, . . . , l〉,
where e ∈ 〈k, . . . , f〉. Recall that dB prioritises shorter
length delegation chains (see definition 8). We show that
voter k has a shorter delegation chain available that does
not include j, i.e. there exists a C ′k such that |C ′k| < |Ck|
and j /∈ C ′k. Let C ′k = 〈k, . . . , e, g, . . . , i〉. Accord-
ing to dB , the delegation chain used to assign j’s guru,
〈j . . . , e, g, . . . , i〉, is shorter or equal in length to any
other alternative, thus |〈j, . . . , e, g, . . . , i〉| ≤ |〈j, . . . , l〉|.
Observe that
|〈g, . . . , i〉| < |〈j, . . . , e, g, . . . , i〉| ≤ |〈j, . . . , l〉 ⇒
|〈k, . . . , e〉|+ |〈g, . . . , i〉| < |〈k, . . . , e〉|+ |〈j, . . . , l〉|.
Since e ∈ 〈k, . . . , f〉, we can rewrite the previous as
|〈k, ..., e〉|+ |〈g, ..., i〉| < |〈k, ..., f〉|+ |〈j, ..., l〉|.
Therefore, rule dB should use C ′k to assign k’s guru.
However, since j /∈ C ′k, the assumption is contradicted.
The contradictions of both (a) and (b) prove this lemma.
Theorem 3. Given a voting rule f ∈ F¯ , guru participation
is guaranteed to hold when using the breadth-first delegation
rule dB .
Proof. By Observation 2, given voters j and k in the delegat-
ing electorate, if a voter k does not delegate through j, then
k’s assigned guru (if any) is the same as if j abstained. By
Lemma 2, if a voter k delegates through j, then the guru of k
is the same as the guru of j. Combining the above cases, we
show that (regardless of k delegating through j or not), when-
ever a voter j joins the delegating electorate and is assigned
to a guru i, then i is the only casting voter who increases the
number of times she becomes a guru. Since also f ∈ F¯ , then
Observation 1 holds, meaning that the breadth-first delegation
rule dB is guaranteed to satisfy guru participation.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we discuss the depth-first and the breadth-first
delegation rule proving that only the latter has the desirable
property that every guru weakly prefers receiving delegating
voting rights. However, there could be other delegation rules
satisfying the same or other interesting properties that im-
prove the concept of liquid democracy. Towards this path,
we note that the issue of current liquid democracy implemen-
tations suffering from a small subset of gurus representing
a large part of the electorate (Kling et al. 2015) could be
counteracted by the breadth-first delegation rule, as this rule
favours keeping delegated voting rights close to their origin.
We strongly believe that this hypothesis should be investi-
gated. Other interesting future work include investigating
guru participation with voting rules that do not satisfy cast
participation, relaxing the assumption of strict personal rank-
ings over voters, and analysing other types of participation.
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